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Andrew Smyth 
Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between product innovation and the success of price collusion using novel 
laboratory experiments. Average market prices in low innovation (LO) experiments are significantly higher than 
those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments. This price difference is attributed to LO 
experimental subjects' greater common market experience. The data illustrate how collusion can be perceived 
as the "only way to make it" in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable strategy for increasing 
profits. They suggest that product homogeneity can be a proximate cause, and product innovation an ultimate 
cause, of collusion. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
HI High Innovation 
LA Liberal Arts School 
LO Low Innovation 
LOB Line of Business 
R Research School 
R&D Research and Development 
SHI "Super" High Innovation 
SIC Standard Industry Classification 
VIFs Variance Inflation Factors 
 
I. Introduction 
[W]e're not competing with a unique article here. Our bags and boxes aren't really any better or worse 
than those of our competitors...The only way to get a buyer is to sell at a lower price. Thus competitors 
may think that the only way to make it is to get together and fix prices. 
— Folding box executive who participated in a price conspiracy1 
This paper tests whether price collusion is more successful in markets like the epigraph's folding cardboard box 
market, than in markets where firms can more easily innovate to escape competition. It reports data from 
laboratory experiments where subjects repeatedly make "product innovation" and pricing decisions. The 
experimental treatments differ only in the ex ante likelihood of innovation, and so mimic two very different 
markets: "high innovation" (HI) markets where firms frequently develop differentiated new products and "low 
innovation" (LO) markets where firms almost always sell homogeneous products. 
The empirical price fixing literature finds that collusive markets are often characterized by product 
homogeneity.2 Product innovation affects the degree of product homogeneity in a market, so it is natural to ask: 
how does product innovation affect price collusion? This paper aims to help fill a void in the literature by 
empirically examining the causal link between product innovation, product differentiation, and price collusion.3 
In the experiments reported here, "product innovation" is a function of an exogenous parameter that 
determines the likelihood of innovative success, and of subjects' endogenous decisions about how much to 
spend on innovation. Innovative success results in perfect product differentiation, whereas innovative failure 
means perfect product homogeneity. The experimental design varies the aforementioned exogenous innovation 
parameter across treatments—holding all else constant. 
By design there are no predicted price differences between the HI and LO treatments, yet observed prices in the 
LO treatments are significantly greater than those in the HI treatments. The data show that subjects in the LO 
treatments are better at maintaining supra‐competitive prices than their HI counterparts. Moreover, while this 
collusive success is affected by the exogenously determined likelihood of innovative success, collusive success 
does not affect innovation expenditure, so the price results are driven by the exogenous innovation parameter. 
The results reported in this paper suggest that a lack of product innovation can be the ultimate cause of 
collusive success, whereas product homogeneity resulting from a lack of product innovation is a proximate cause 
of collusive success. The experimental data illustrate how collusion can come to be perceived as the "only way 
to make it" in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable way to increase profits. In the next section, I 
motivate the use of laboratory experiments. In Section III, I outline the experimental design, calculate innovation 
benchmarks for the experiments, and report the experimental data. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. Why an Experiment? 
Before discussing the experimental design, I first motivate my use of laboratory experiments by outlining the 
shortcomings of using archival data to examine the relationship between innovation and collusion. I created a 
sample of historical price conspiracies by examining all citations listed under "price fixing" in the indices of 
Commerce Clearing House Trade Cases books for the years 1972–1982. My sample includes all (prosecuted) 
horizontal price conspiracies that took place in a Standard Industry Classification (SIC) manufacturing industry. I 
chose this 10‐year sample period in order to match the conspiracy sample with data from the Federal Trade 
Commission's Annual Line of Business (LOB) Report for 1977.4 
Table A1 in the Appendix lists the final sample, which totals 50 conspiracies. Thirty‐seven of the 50 (74%) 
occurred in industries with below‐average research and development (R&D) intensity, as calculated from the 
LOB data.5 A robust rank order test concludes that the mean of the distribution of R&D intensities for collusive 
industries is lower than the corresponding mean for noncollusive industries (𝑈  =  1.86,  𝑝  =  0.032, one‐tailed). 
Table  gives estimation results for two Probit specifications.6 The variable Collusion is an indicator for a 
conspiracy having been detected and punished in the SIC industry during a 10‐year window around 
1977. Profit is calculated as the ratio of operating income to sales, ADInt is a proxy for product differentiation 
and is calculated as the ratio of advertising expense to revenue, Size proxies barriers to entry and is the natural 
logarithm of assets, and C4 is the industry's adjusted four‐firm concentration ratio.7 Finally, RDInt is R&D 
intensity, calculated as the ratio of firm R&D costs to revenue. 
Table 1: Probit Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Collusion 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
Constant −2.854 −3.288  
(1.275) (1.438) 
Profit −2.965 −1.159  
(2.562) (2.751) 
ADInt −9.418 −9.659  
(6.738) (6.601) 
Size 0.196 0.234  
(0.094) (0.104) 




−19.280   
(10.156) 
Observations 217 202 
Log‐likelihood −84.43 −78.14 
1 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
• 2 * Significant at the 10% level. 
• 3 ** Significant at the 5% level. 
• 4 ***Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Model 1 is similar to a specification in Asch and Seneca's (1976) well‐known empirical price‐fixing study, and the 
estimates here are qualitatively the same. Model 2 adds RDInt to the specification. Its coefficient estimate is 
statistically significant and negative in sign. The addition of RDInt to the specification causes a statistically 
significant improvement in log‐likelihood (𝐿𝑅  =  12.57,  𝑝  <  0.001). 
The inverse relationship between Collusion and RDInt in Model 2 is at least consistent with innovation affecting 
price collusion. However, collinearity is a potential issue here.8 Another possible problem is that the price 
conspiracy data suffer to an unknown degree from selection bias. Collusion may indicate not only collusion‐
prone industries, but that subset of collusion‐prone industries which are also prosecution‐prone. It is certainly 
possible that successful collusive occurred in additional industries but escaped the detection of antitrust 
authorities.9 
Even ignoring possible econometric issues, the significant, negative coefficient estimate on RDInt in Model 2 
reveals correlation between price collusion and R&D intensity, not necessarily causation. The inverse 
relationship might stem from firms who are successfully colluding, reducing their innovation intensities. Such 
behavior has been empirically documented: Erickson (1976) reports that price conspiracies had a detrimental 
effect on cost innovation in gymnasium seating, rock salt, and structural steel. 
With these issues in mind, laboratory experiments were conducted to see if exogenous variation in the 
likelihood of innovation causes observed variance in the success of price collusion.10 
III. The Experiments 
These experiments were designed to incorporate "product innovation" into laboratory markets so as to permit 
exogenous variation in the likelihood of innovation across multiple treatments. In this paper, "successful 
collusion" refers to firms' abilities to maintain supra‐competitive prices. If the data reveal differences in market 
prices across treatments, they support the conjecture that innovation affects the success of price collusion. 
The laboratory research most related to these experiments involves product differentiation (see Brown-Kruse, et 
al., 1993; Brown-Kruse and Schenk, 2000; Collins and Sherstyuk, 2000; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2001; 
Barreda-Tarrazona, et al., 2011). In these papers, differentiation is captured by location choice. Here, innovation 
success or failure determines the number of firms in a market. Innovation is not rivalrous—one subject's 
innovation success is independent of another's.11 If successful, subjects enjoy one period of monopoly power; if 
unsuccessful, they must compete with other unsuccessful subjects in a Bertrand–Edgeworth market. 
In this paper, successful innovation affords an innovator a perfectly appropriable market. When unsuccessful, 
appropriability is nil; subjects compete in a perfectly homogeneous market whose size varies from one to four 
firms. This stark design allows for exogenous variation in the ex ante likelihood of innovative success. The 
experiments reflect two types of markets: one in which firms frequently develop short‐lived, perfectly 
differentiated new products and another in which firms rarely develop such "killer" products and so almost 
always compete to sell a homogeneous product.12 
A. Experimental Design 
In these experiments, undergraduate students with no prior experience in similar experimental markets made 
innovation and pricing decisions. Prior to the start of the experiment, the subjects were randomly assigned into 
groups of four, and they remained in their group for 25 subsequent periods. Each period was subdivided into 
two stages: an Innovation stage and a Market stage. In Innovation stages, subjects made innovation expenditure 
decisions, and in Market stages they made pricing decisions. Table 2 lists the key experimental parameters. 
Table 2: Experimental Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Endowment $4.00 
Attempts [0, 20] 
Cost per attempt $0.10 
Prob(Innovation|1 Attempt) 5%, 15%, or 25% 
Price [$8.25, $20.00] 
Unit production costs 
 
𝑞  ≤  3 $8.15 
𝑞  =  4 $8.25 
𝑞  >  4 ∞ 
Market stage length 
 
Periods 1–5 60 seconds 
Periods 6–25 40 seconds 
5 Note: The $ sign denotes experimental dollars. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were endowed $4.00 (where the $ sign denotes experimental 
dollars). In each Innovation stage, every subject was given the option of purchasing 𝑎 innovation attempts. Each 
attempt cost $0.10. Subjects could purchase up to 20 attempts each period. Innovation was a Bernoulli process; 
innovation attempts resulted in innovation success according to the function 𝜃(𝑎)   =  1  −  (1  −  𝜌)𝑎. The 
probability that any one attempt was successful, ρ, was 5%, 15%, or 25% as discussed below. Attempts were 
purchased prior to the realization of the innovation outcomes, so all a attempts were paid for, regardless of 
whether they were necessary to achieve innovation success ex post. 
If a subject was successful, they developed a "New product" that they could sell as a monopolist for one (the 
current) period. In other words, if a subject was successful in an Innovation stage, they posted a price in their 
own New product market during the subsequent Market stage. Subjects who attempted no innovation, or who 
were unsuccessful in their attempts, competed in a Bertrand–Edgeworth market with other unsuccessful sellers 
from their group to sell a homogeneous "Standard product." As a function of the subjects' endogenous 
innovation expenditures and the stochastic innovation process, this Standard product market contained either 
1, 2, 3, or 4 sellers.13 If three of the four sellers in a group were successful, the lone unsuccessful subject in the 
Standard product market had their price automatically set to the lowest allowable price of $8.25. This ensured 
that no unsuccessful innovator enjoyed monopoly power. Figure 1 shows how market type and the number of 
firms in the market were determined.14 
 
Figure 1: Determination of Market Type and Size 
The Market stage was timed. During the first five periods of the experiment, subjects had 60 seconds to submit a 
price. For the final 20 periods, they had 40 seconds.15 They were permitted to change their price as many times 
as they wished before time expired. While they could adjust their price, they could not see other subjects' prices 
prior to the end of the stage. A red timer counted down the remaining market time in a prominent location on 
each subject's computer screen. 
For the entire experiment, the first 3 units a subject might sell cost $8.15 to produce. The 4th unit they might 
sell cost $8.25. Sellers were capacity‐constrained at 4 units. Units were "made to order," so production costs 
were only borne for units actually sold. Market demand and one seller's marginal costs are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Experimental Market Demand 
The demand sides of the markets were automated. Each computerized buyer demanded a single unit at a 
unique reservation price. The queue was not random; buyers "queued up" in descending order of their 
reservation price ($10.01, $9.76, $9.51,...). In New markets, the monopolist seller sold up to 4 units, depending 
on how many buyers had reservation prices above their posted price. In Standard markets, the seller posting the 
lowest price had the opportunity to make sales first. Buyers bought from a seller, conditional on that seller's 
price being less than their reservation price. If there was residual demand after the low‐price seller made sales, 
the seller with the next lowest price could make sales. Thus, it was possible (and most often the case) that units 
of the homogeneous product sold for different prices in the same Standard market. When two or more sellers 
posted the same price, market demand was split evenly when possible. The experimental software randomly 
awarded the extra unit(s) in cases where demand could not be evenly split. 
Because I am interested in differences in collusion across treatments and not collusion per se, the Market stage 
was constructed to lessen the coordination burden of collusion. It had the following features: (1) subjects could 
adjust their price as many times as they wished before market time expired, (2) their prices were publicly 
posted, (3) subjects were identified by numbers (i.e., Seller 1, ..., Seller 4) that were fixed throughout all 25 
periods, (4) subjects could send unrestricted chat messages during Standard Market stages, and (5) subjects 
received feedback at the end of each period on the quantities sold by all members of their group. These features 
facilitated collusion in other experimental studies.16 They were present in all treatments. 
There were two main treatments: a LO treatment where the chance of innovation success per attempt was 𝜌  =
 5%, and a HI treatment where 𝜌  =  15%. A third, "super" high innovation (SHI) treatment with 𝜌  =  25% is 
discussed below. Aside from the different ρ's, the treatments were exactly identical. Prior to the start of the 
experiment, subjects read instructions and had to successfully complete a short quiz on their content before 
proceeding. Although the rationing rules for the two market types were explained to the subjects in detail, they 
were not told the specific reservation prices of the automated buyers. Please see Appendix S1 (Supporting 
Information) for the instructions. 
B. Innovation Benchmarks 
In this section, I report innovation benchmarks for each treatment.17 Because innovation decisions were 
independent across periods, I construct the benchmarks for a single, representative period. To derive innovation 
benchmarks, I first determine Market stage profits and then use these values to calculate the benchmarks. I 
assume risk‐neutral firms who innovate symmetrically. In other words, I assume that four firms independently 
select 𝑎 innovation attempts each period. 
The Market stage prices, quantities, and profits used to calculate innovation benchmarks are shown in Table 3. 
Recall from Section III.A that price in the 𝑛  =  1 Standard market is set to $8.25, which implies 4.00 units sold. A 
unique pure strategy equilibrium of $8.25 exists for the three‐ and four‐seller Standard markets but there is no 
pure strategy price equilibrium for the two‐seller market.18 In the three‐seller Standard market, firms sell 
2.67 units in expectation (8 units divided by three sellers), and in the four‐seller Standard market each firm sells 
2.00 units. For the two‐seller case, I calculate the mean of the distribution of prices in the symmetric mixed‐
strategy equilibrium to be $8.59, and I assume a quantity of 3.00 units.19 Finally, in the 𝑛  =  1 New market, 
profit‐maximization implies 4.00 units sold at a price of $9.26. Importantly, the prices in Table 3 are the same 
across the LO, HI, and SHI treatments. In addition to calculating benchmarks using the profits in Table 3, I 
calculate a second set of benchmarks using actual profit data from the experiments (this is described below). 
Table 3: Market Values 
Market Type Price Quantity Profit 
Standard 𝑛  =  1 8.25 4.00 0.30 
Standard 𝑛  =  2 8.59 3.00 1.32 
Standard 𝑛  =  3 8.25 2.67 0.27 
Standard 𝑛  =  4 8.25 2.00 0.20 
New (𝑛  =  1) 9.26 4.00 4.34 
 
Every period, there are 16 (2𝑛) possible innovation outcomes in the four firm market. Firm 𝑖 successfully 
innovates in eight of the outcomes and is unsuccessful and ends up in a Standard market in the other half of the 
outcomes. For the three firms that are not Firm 𝑖, let 𝜙𝑛(𝑎)   =   [𝜃(𝑎)]
3−𝑛[1  −  𝜃(𝑎)]𝑛 be the probability 
that 𝑛  ≤  3 of these firms fail to successfully innovate when all firms independently make 𝑎 innovation 
attempts. 
Among the eight cases where Firm 𝑖 is unsuccessful, there are three outcomes where two firms besides 
Firm 𝑖 are unsuccessful (3𝜙2) and three outcomes where one other firm besides Firm 𝑖 is unsuccessful (3𝜙1). 
There is also one outcome where all three firms besides Firm 𝑖 are unsuccessful (𝜙3) and one outcome where 
Firm 𝑖 is the only unsuccessful firm (𝜙0). Putting this together, Firm 𝑖 's expected profit in the event that all four 
firms innovate symmetrically is: 
Π𝑖𝑎 = 𝜃𝑎𝜋𝑁 + 1 − 𝜃𝑎𝜙3𝑎𝜋3 + 3𝜙2𝑎𝜋2 + 3𝜙1𝑎𝜋1 + 𝜙0𝑎𝜋0 − 𝑐𝑎 (1) 
where 𝜋𝑁 is the New market profit and 𝜋𝑛 is the profit in the Standard market with 𝑛 firms. The coefficient 𝑐 is 
the cost per innovation attempt, which was $0.10 in the experiments. 
The innovation benchmarks that I report for each treatment are the 𝑎 ∈  [0, 20] that maximize Πi(𝑎). 
Equivalently, they are the number of attempts (𝑎∗) for which the expected marginal return from innovation 
equals the marginal cost of innovation. Figure 3 plots the expected marginal return from innovation for each 
treatment. The vertical axis is denominated in experimental dollars ($)—the currency used in the experiments. 
The expected return varies across treatments because the probability of success per attempt parameter (ρ) 
varies across treatments. The innovation success function in LO is less concave than the related functions in SHI 
and HI, so the expected marginal return curve for LO in Figure 3 is flatter than the marginal return curves for SHI 
and HI. 
 
Figure 3: Expected Marginal Return and Cost of Innovation 
Table 4 lists the innovation benchmarks and shows the likelihood that a firm ends up in the New market if they 
choose the benchmark number of attempts, that is, the probability 𝜃(𝑎∗). Note that the SHI benchmark is eight 
attempts because, as Figure 3 shows, the expected marginal return to nine attempts is less than the marginal 
cost of nine attempts and non‐integer attempts (e.g., 8.4) were not permitted in the experiment. 
Table 4: Innovation Benchmarks 
Treatment Number of Attempts (Calculated 
with Theoretical Profit) 
New Market 
Likelihood 
Number of Attempts 
(Calculated 
with Actual Profit) 
New Market 
Likelihood 
LO‐R 14 0.51 9 0.37 
HI‐R 11 0.83 8 0.73 
LO‐LA 14 0.51 9 0.37 
HI‐LA 11 0.83 7 0.68 
SHI‐LA 8 0.90 8 0.90 
6 Note: The actual profit benchmarks were generated using the observed average profits from each treatment 
(see Table ). 
Because prices actually observed in the experiments may differ substantially from the prices in Table 3, I also 
calculate innovation benchmarks using the average prices in each treatment. In other words, I use the prices in 
Table (see below) for (𝜋𝑁,  𝜋1,  𝜋2,  𝜋3,  𝜋4). Table 4 suggests that LO subjects may attempt more innovation 
than HI or SHI subjects.20 When actual profits are used to generate innovation benchmarks, the benchmarks 
suggest similar amounts of innovation attempted in each treatment. 
There are two results from this section to reiterate in summary: (1) For any market type, observed prices should 
be the same across treatments, and (2) LO subjects should attempt more innovation than HI or SHI subjects, but 
are likely to spend more time during the experiment in Standard markets than are HI or SHI subjects.21 
C. Results 
The experiments were conducted at two universities: a large, public research school (R) and a small, private 
liberal arts school (LA).22 Subjects were recruited with ORSEE at the research school (Greiner, 2015) and by 
proprietary recruitment software at the liberal arts school. In both locations, the experiment was executed in z‐
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All treatments lasted approximately 1.5 hours, including roughly 15 minutes of 
computerized instructions. There were a total of 240 subjects, 48 in each treatment. Subjects had no previous 
experience in similar markets and no subject participated more than once.23 I now report the experimental 
results. 
Did Innovation Vary across Treatments? 
I first focus on the Innovation stage data from the LO and HI treatments and ask: did attempted innovation vary 
across treatments, and if so, did subjects get differential experience in certain market types across treatments? 
I begin by reporting the distribution of innovation attempts. Figures 4A and 4D are kernel density estimates of 
the average number of innovation attempts per subject (the average is across all 25 periods), by treatment. 
Individual frequency distributions are also presented in the Appendix for all 240 subjects. In Figure 4, there 
appears to be a treatment difference across LO and HI in the R data, but not in the LA data. 
 
Figure 4: Innovation Results, by Treatment 
Figures 4B and 4E show the average number of innovation attempts per market across time. Clearly, on average, 
subjects in both treatments under‐invested in innovation relative to the benchmarks from Section B.24 Figure 3 
suggests a possible explanation for this result: for a small number of attempts, the expected marginal return 
from an attempt is greater in HI than in LO. Subjects may have keyed on this fact instead of on equating the 
marginal return and marginal cost of innovation. 
Despite the benchmarks suggesting more innovation attempts in LO than HI, HI subjects attempted more 
innovation than LO subjects in both populations. The attempts graphs in Figure 4 and the average attempts per 
period figures in Table 5 indicate that the level of innovation attempted was not robust to changes in the subject 
population. For each treatment, the liberal arts school subjects attempted less innovation than the research 
school subjects. However, there was a robust treatment effect: in both populations, subjects attempted more 
innovation in HI than LO. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics  
LO‐R HI‐R LO‐LA HI‐LA SHI‐LA 
Subjects 48 48 48 48 48 
Markets 12 12 12 12 12 
Success per attempt (ρ) 5% 15% 5% 15% 25% 
Mean attempts per period 2.42 4.43 1.67 2.45 2.99 
Time in New market 10% 46% 7% 27% 52% 
Time in Standard market 90% 54% 93% 73% 48% 
Modal # firms in market 4 1 4 1 1 
Mean period earnings ($) 0.66 1.62 0.71 1.19 1.93 
Mean total earnings ($) 16.94 40.58 18.04 29.91 48.26 
7 Note: The $ symbol denotes experimental dollars. 
Because innovation success was an increasing function of the number of innovation attempts, and because 
more innovation was attempted in HI, LO and HI subjects had differential experience in certain market types. 
Figures 4C and 4F show the distribution of market‐periods across the number of firms in the market (denoted 
by n).25 In both figures, "New" refers to the New market, and 𝑛  =  1 refers to the 𝑛  =  1 Standard market. 
The number of market‐periods of experience increased monotonically with the number of firms in the market in 
both LO treatments (ignoring the 𝑛  =  1 Standard market type). By contrast, in the HI‐R treatment, the number 
of market‐periods decreased monotonically with the number of firms in the market (again, ignoring 𝑛  =  1 
Standard markets). Table 5 shows that the modal number of firms in the market was 𝑛  =  4 in LO, but was the 
New (𝑛  =  1) market in the HI treatment. Subjects were in Standard markets 90% and 93% of the time in LO‐R 
and LO‐LA, respectively, but were in a Standard market just 54% of the time in HI‐R. 
As predicted by the innovation benchmarks, LO‐R subjects ended up in Standard markets more frequently than 
HI‐R subjects. Interestingly, while HI‐LA subjects attempted more innovation than LO‐LA subjects, they did not 
attempt nearly as much innovation as HI‐R subjects. As a result, HI‐LA subjects spent 73% of their time in a 
Standard market. Because relatively little innovation was attempted in HI‐LA, an additional SHI treatment was 
conducted with subjects from the liberal arts school population. The chance of innovation success per attempt 
was ρ = 25% for this treatment. This value of ρ was chosen with the hope of replicating a distribution for the 
number of firms in the market that is closer to HI‐R than HI‐LA. 
To see the effect of increasing ρ to 25% in the LA subject population, compare HI‐R in Figure C to HI‐LA and SHI‐
LA in Figure 4F. This comparison shows that the distribution of the number of firms in the market in SHI‐LA was 
much closer to that in HI‐R than it was to the distribution of the number of firms in the market in HI‐LA. Having 
established that LO‐R (LO‐LA) subjects spent more time in Standard markets and less time in New markets than 
HI‐R (SHI‐LA) subjects, I now report Market stage data, beginning with an analysis of chat messages in Standard 
markets. 
How Did Subjects Communicate? 
Table 6 lists the total number of chat messages, the total number of chat messages that contained a number 
(e.g., a price), and the 15 most frequently used words, each by treatment.26 The total number of messages is 
also reported per Standard market‐period to account for the greater Standard market experience of LO subjects. 
The data suggest that subjects in LO treatments communicated more frequently than their higher innovation 
treatment counterparts. Across all Standard markets, LO‐R subjects communicated nearly three times as often 
as HI‐R subjects. They sent an average of 2.6 chat messages per market‐period, compared to 0.9 messages per 
market‐period in HI‐R. In the liberal arts school sessions, LO‐LA subjects sent over one and a half times as many 
messages per market‐period as SHI‐LA subjects (3.3 to 2.0), and exactly one and a half times as many messages 
per market‐period as HI‐LA subjects (3.3 to 2.2). 
Table 6: Chat Analysis  
LO‐R HI‐R LO‐LA HI‐LA SHI‐LA 
Total messages (mean per 
market‐period) 
783 (2.6) 201 (0.9) 967 (3.3) 591 (2.2) 390 (2.0) 
Total messages containing a 
number (percent of total) 
316 (40%) 84 (42%) 417 (43%) 246 (42%) 122 (31%) 
Most frequently used words 
(times used) 
all (92) all (34) all (110) all (87) all (58) 
 
you (63) put (25) you (90) price (73) price (55) 
 
seller (62) price (24) time (61) you (66) you (47)  
price (49) lets (23) try (53) money (48) money (32)  
one (48) same (22) price (52) make (48) have (29)  
put (45) profit (18) money (51) put (37) high (29)  
time (42) money (15) make (48) try (36) make (29)  
everyone (39) make (13) more (48) have (36) everyone (28)  
try (36) you (13) everyone (48) time (35) will (26)  
money (36) time (12) seller (43) same (34) more (26)  
then (33) more (11) lets (41) lets (33) sell (26)  
profit (29) then (10) one (41) high (33) time (25)  
each (29) should (10) then (39) seller (33) same (23)  
get (29) one (9) will (34) more (31) each (23)  
more (29) will (8) round (33) everyone (30) seller (23) 
8 Note: Only words with more than two letters are listed and the words the, and, this, that, for, what, and lol are 
excluded. 
Several recent papers explore issues related to antitrust enforcement using experiments, but because of the 
complexity of the subjects' decision task in this paper, these experiments had no "antitrust enforcement."27 
Adding enforcement to this design ran the risk of overwhelming subjects, and as noted in Section III.A, this paper 
focuses on collusion across treatments, not on the existence of collusion per se. Because subjects faced no 
threat of punishment for explicitly communicating about prices, messages from early periods included:  
Period 2 of a LO‐R market: " do you guys want to each sell at the same price? " 
Period 3 of a SHI‐LA market: " lets all do above 8.25 " 
Period 4 of a HI‐LA market: " Why don't we both sell at high prices? " 
Period 3 of a LO‐LA market: " lets try something like 915? " 
Period 5 of a HI‐R market: " dont do 8.25 then none of us profit silly " 
Period 7 of a LO‐R market: " can we all agree on $9? " 
Period 8 of a HI‐R market: " how about we all put the same price " 
Period 8 of a SHI‐LA market: " we will all make more go high not low " 
 
As these examples suggest, price discussions often involve numbers. Table 6 reveals that in four of the five 
treatments, messages included numbers 40%–43% of the time. In SHI‐LA, only 31% of messages contained a 
number. 
The most frequently used words in each treatment are listed in Table 6, and the number of times each word was 
used is in parenthesis. Note that the words are essentially identical across treatments. High usage of words 
like all, everyone, and lets, as well as price, money, and profit indicate that as in previous collusion experiments 
with communication, subjects used the chat interface to further price manipulation. But were subjects equally 
successful at price fixing across treatments? To answer this question, I turn to this paper's main empirical results 
that compare prices across the treatments. 
Did Prices Vary across Treatments? 
In this paper, "collusive success" refers to firms' abilities to maintain supra‐competitive prices, so in this section I 
report price data from the experiments as averages and distributions. Table 7 contains average market prices. 
For market m in period t, let the share‐weighted market price be: 
?̅?𝑡





Table7: Average Market Prices 
Number of Firms Theory LO‐R HI‐R LO‐LA HI‐LA SHI‐LA Mean 
𝑛  =  1 (New) 9.26 9.34 9.30 9.15 9.28 9.24 9.26   
(0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
𝑛  =  2 8.59 8.80 8.68 8.71 8.79 8.73 8.74   
(0.14) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) 
𝑛  =  3 8.25 8.58 8.58 8.85 8.66 8.57 8.65   
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
𝑛  =  4 8.25 8.62 8.44 8.72 8.63 8.36 8.55   
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
9 Notes: Theoretical prices are explained in Section III.B. Average market price is Equation (2) averaged over all 
markets (in a treatment) and time. All prices in experimental dollars. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
where 𝑛𝑚𝑡 denotes the number of sellers in market m in period 𝑡, and 𝑠𝑡
𝑖  and 𝑝𝑡
𝑖  are Firm 𝑖 's market share and 
price, respectively. The average market price is ?̅?𝑡
𝑚 averaged over all similar markets and over all periods. 
Table 7 shows that average market prices decreased in the number of firms in the market. Note that the average 
New market price across all treatments was exactly the theoretical profit‐maximizing price. For each Standard 
market type, average market prices were all above the theoretical prices. Pooling and averaging the price 
statistics from Table  for the two LO treatments and comparing the result to the pooled average for the three 
HI/SHI treatments, there is no large price difference for the 𝑛  =  1 New markets (the LO average is $0.01 
greater). However, the LO price averages are $0.05, $0.09, and $0.10 greater than the HI/SHI price averages in 
the 𝑛  =  2, 𝑛  =  3, and 𝑛  =  4 Standard markets, respectively. In other words, average prices were higher in LO 
markets relative to HI/SHI markets. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of average market prices across treatments. It contains empirical cumulative 
distribution functions for the New market and the 𝑛  >  1 Standard markets. The horizontal axis in the figures 
is ?̅?𝑡
𝑚. Some treatment differences are apparent in Figure 5. In Figures 5A and 5C, the distribution of prices from 
LO‐LA is different from the distributions of prices in the other treatments. In Figure 5D, the distributions of 
prices from HI‐R and SHI‐LA are different from the distributions of prices in the other treatments. 
 
Figure 5: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions, by Market Type and Size 
I conduct robust rank order tests to determine if the price differences suggested by Table 7 and Figure 5 are 
statistically significant.28 The tests were conducted on market average prices over all periods because 
observations are not independent across periods. I pool the LO data and the HI/SHI data across subject 
populations, so the null hypothesis for each test is that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for 
the LO treatments equals the corresponding mean for the HI/SHI treatments. 
Table 8 indicates that there is no significant difference in price across the LO and HI/SHI data for the 𝑛  =  1 New 
market and for the 𝑛  =  2 Standard market. The null hypothesis can be rejected at 𝛼  =  0.10 for the 𝑛  =  3 
Standard markets and it can also be rejected at 𝛼  =  0.05 for the 𝑛  =  4 Standard markets.29 The comparisons 
in this section all indicate that average prices were higher in LO Standard markets relative to HI and SHI Standard 
markets. What explains this result? 
Table 8: Robust Rank Order Test Results for Price 
Number of Firms U p Value 
𝑛  =  1 (New) 1.182 0.237 
𝑛  =  2 −0.357 0.721 
𝑛  =  3 −1.693 0.090 
𝑛  =  4 −2.566 0.010 
10 Note: The null hypothesis for each test is that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for the 
LO treatments equals the corresponding mean for the HI/SHI treatments. 
Does Experience Explain the Price Variance? 
In light of the price data, note again the disparity in the number of 𝑛  =  4 market‐periods across the low and 
higher innovation treatments in Figure 4. Did LO subjects' greater experience in the 𝑛  =  4 markets affect 
prices? 
Figure 6 graphs market price on market experience for the Standard markets with the most firms (𝑛  =  4). 
Specifically, it shows the average of ?̅?𝑡
𝑚 over t on the number of 𝑛  =  4 market‐periods for market m. The line in 












Figure 6: Market Price on 𝑛  =  4 Market Experience 
where Experience𝑚 is the total number of periods that market m was in a 𝑛  =  4 market.30 Across all 
treatments, market experience had a significant, positive effect on market price in 𝑛  =  4 markets. 
While it is conceivable that experience was endogenous to price in the above regression, this is unlikely in 
principle. Even if all firms post the joint monopoly price of $9.26 in an 𝑛  =  4 market, they only receive one‐
quarter of the profit they would receive in a New market.31 So it seems unlikely that firms would reduce their 
innovation expenditure (which affects experience) because of the market price. Still, I now examine individual 
innovation decisions to see if past collusive success affected future innovation decisions. 
Did Collusive Success Affect Innovation? 
The preceding results suggest that the exogenously determined likelihood of innovative success affected market 
outcomes. It is also possible that market outcomes, in turn, endogenously affected innovation decisions. For 
example, subjects who successfully coordinated to raise market price may have subsequently curtailed their 
innovative activity. 
To investigate the relationship between collusive success and subjects' innovation expenditures, a distributed 
lag model was estimated for each subject: 
Innovation𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 ⋅ Profit𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑘=1 , (4) 
where Innovation𝑖,𝑡 is subject 𝑖′s innovation expenditure and Profit𝑖,𝑡−𝑘k is market profit (gross of innovation 
expenditures) in period 𝑡  −  𝑘. The coefficient estimate ?̂?𝑖,1 is the impulse propensity in innovation expenditure 
from changes in market profit during period 𝑡  −  1. If a subject successfully coordinates with other subjects to 
raise the Standard market price, and then reduces his or her innovation expenditure in order to profit 
maximize, ?̂?𝑖,1 < 0. In other words, if innovation expenditure is endogenous to collusive success, the impulse 
propensity is negative. 
Figure 7 shows ?̂?𝑖,1 for each subject, organized by treatment, when specification (4) was estimated separately 
for all 240 subjects with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Because of the five lags, each 
estimating sample had 20 observations. Estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level (two‐
tailed t test) are filled‐in. Table 9 shows the percentage of βi,1 estimates that are both negative and statistically 
significant when specification (4) is estimated with between one and five lagged profit values. 
 
Figure 7: Estimates of 𝛽𝑖,1 in Model 4 
Table 9: Summary of Impulse Propensity Estimation     











?̂?𝒊,𝟏 < 𝟎 𝜶  =  𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 𝜶  =  𝟎. 𝟎𝟓 𝜶 
=  𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 
1 240 24 34.6% 0.4% 2.9% 6.3% 
2 240 23 34.2% 1.3% 4.6% 7.1% 
3 240 22 36.7% 1.3% 2.9% 7.1% 
4 240 21 34.2% 0.8% 3.8% 5.0% 
5 240 20 31.7% 1.7% 4.6% 5.0% 
 
Note that regardless of the number of lags included in (4), fewer than 5% of the estimated impulse propensities 
are negative and significant when 𝛼  =  0.05. To the extent that serial correlation is present in the data, even the 
significant estimates in Figure 7 and Table 9 may be chimeric, as serial correlation lowers standard errors. 
Finally, the economic magnitude of the estimates is trivial. For the five‐lag specification, they suggest that, on 
average, a $1.00 increase in market profit resulted in a $0.02 increase in innovation expenditure. 
As a robustness check on the impulse propensity results, a second regression was estimated by pooled ordinary 
least squares. The specification is: 
Innovation𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜓 + 𝛿0Period𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 ⋅ Profit𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝐿
𝑘=1




where Period𝑡 is a linear time trend, the number of lags is 𝐿 ∈  {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and Subject𝑖 is individual 
subject 𝑖′s fixed effect. Standard errors were clustered at the market level. 
Table 10 shows the results of estimating specification (5). Regardless of the number of lags that are included in 
estimation (one to five), the coefficient estimates on lagged profit are always highly significant and positive. 
Moreover, the magnitude of each estimate is very small. Table 10 thus suggests—in line with the summary of 
individual regression results in Table 9—that an increase in market profit did not reduce innovation expenditure. 
Table 10: Regression Results 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Innovation Expenditure 
 
   
Constant 0.259 0.173 0.162 0.134 0.132  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
Period −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Profitt−1 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.016  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Profitt−2 
 
0.014 0.013 0.011 0.010   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Profitt−3 
  
0.011 0.009 0.008    
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Profitt−4 
   
0.009 0.008     
(0.002) (0.002) 
Profitt−5 
    
0.008      
(0.002) 
Fixed effects Subject Subject Subject Subject Subject 
R2 0.59 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.71 
Observations 5,760 5,520 5,280 5,040 4,800 
11 Notes: Coefficient estimates on individual subject fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors (clustered at 
the market level) in parentheses. 
12 *Significant at the 10% level. 
13 **Significant at the 5% level. 
14 *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The experimental results in this paper can be summarized as follows: the exogenously greater likelihood of 
innovation in HI and SHI induced more innovation expenditure in those markets relative to the LO markets. This 
difference translated into more 𝑛  =  4 market experience for LO subjects relative to HI‐R and SHI‐LA subjects. 
Market experience then affected the success of price collusion in the manner suggested by Chamberlin (1962):  
If [the firm] is in business permanently, the temporary gains of a price cut are of negligible 
importance...On the other hand, if [the firm] is in the market only temporarily, bent on disposing of a 
certain amount of product, the ultimate consequences do not enter into [its] calculations. 
In the experiments, it was as though HI‐R and SHI‐LA subjects inhabited a world of "killer" products. These 
subjects were in Standard markets far less frequently than their LO counterparts, they rarely ended up in 𝑛  =  4 
markets, and often enjoyed monopoly‐like profit in New markets. The data suggest that when they were in 
Standard markets, the long‐term benefits of abstaining from price sniping did not resonate with HI‐R and SHI‐LA 
subjects. 
The situation was different in LO markets. One LO subject lamented, "the innovative stage is a visual 
representation of [hopes] and dreams being crushed," and another bemoaned, "I wonder what the new market 
is even like." The LO treatment was like a market devoid of killer products. Meager profits and the prospect of 
similar future earnings impressed upon LO subjects the necessity of cooperation. Because innovation was 
infrequent in LO, it was not as disruptive to coordination as in HI‐R or SHI‐LA. 
Importantly, the data provide scant evidence that collusive success affected innovation decisions. Rather, they 
indicate that successful Market stage collusion did not feed back and greatly affect Innovation stage 
expenditure. The observed difference in innovation across treatments stemmed from the exogenous difference 
in the likelihood of innovation and not from any endogenous changes in subject innovation expenditure because 
of market outcomes. 
If the likelihood of product innovation affects price collusion, this helps explain why price collusion appears 
endemic in many markets. Firms that cannot escape competition through product innovation may turn to 
conspiracy as an alternative avenue to supra‐competitive profit. Because these firms cannot innovate their way 
to higher profit, they return time and again to price manipulation. Instead of merry trade meetings turning to 
conspiracy, in LO markets the scene may be better set by Shakespeare than Smith: "O mischief, thou art swift to 
enter in the thoughts of desperate men!" 
  
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 11: Collusion Sample 
Citation SIC Code Industry R&D 
Intensity 
61,368 3273 Ready‐mix concrete n/a 
62,519 3273 Ready‐mix concrete n/a 
63,658 3273 Ready‐mix concrete n/a 
63,659 3273 Ready‐mix concrete n/a 
75,060 3271 Concrete blocks 0.000 
63,424 3272 Precast concrete products 0.000 
63,091 2026 Dairy products 0.001 
63,198 2026 Dairy products 0.001 
63,370 2026 Dairy products 0.001 
64,503 2026 Dairy products 0.001 
64,555 2026 Fluid milk 0.001 
63,180 2011 Meat packing 0.001 
62,235 2062 Refined sugar 0.001 
74,657 3442 Garage doors 0.002 
75,197 2051 Bread 0.002 
61,664 2051 Bread products 0.002 
62,215 2051 Bakery products 0.002 
62,217 2051 Bakery products 0.002 
65,724 2051 Pastries 0.002 
63,586 2951 Asphalt and concrete sales 0.002 
62,916 3353 Aluminum roll jacketing 0.003 
62,702 3449 Reinforcing steel bars 0.003 
64,823 2076 Coconut oil 0.003 
74,929 2077 Rendering 0.003 
63,090 3449 Reinforcing steel bars 0.003 
63,475 3356 Titanium mill products 0.004 
62,992 2657 Folding cartons 0.005 
61,739 2499 Toilet seats 0.005 
64,222 3,452 Standard screws 0.006 
63,000 3496 Swine confinement systems 0.006 
63,181 2673 Consumer bags 0.007 
75,245 2096 Snack foods 0.007 
63,643 2041 Blended foods 0.007 
63,227 2048 Livestock feed 0.008 
62,517 3494 Furnace pipe and fittings 0.010 
63,092 3643 Wiring devices 0.013 
74,945 2298 Nylon twine 0.013 
60,615 2672 Paper labels 0.015 
63,205 2672 Pressure sensitive tape 0.015 
60,785 3965 Zipper sliders 0.016 
63,609 3639 Water heaters 0.016 
60,846 3089 Drainage or plastic pipe fittings 0.017 
63,215 3613 Fuse products 0.018 
61,447 2865 Dyes 0.020 
63,844 2869 Dimethyl sulfoxide 0.020 
63,784 3541 Metal‐working machinery 0.024 
65,742 3952 Art materials 0.024 
62,901 2821 Persulfate 0.025 
63,610 2821 Coatings resins 0.025 
63,622 3824 Gas meters 0.043 
15 Notes: Horizontal price collusion in manufacturing industries, 1972–1982. Citations from Commerce Clearing 
House Trade Cases books. R&D intensity calculated from LOB data. 
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Footnotes 
1 Quoted in Sonnenfeld and Lawrence ([32]). 
2 See Hay and Kelley ([20]), Asch and Seneca ([2]), Fraas and Greer ([17]), Scherer and Ross ([30]), Dick ([13]), 
Symeonidis ([33]), and Levenstein and Suslow ([25]). 
3 The full links between product innovation, product differentiation, and price collusion have also received little 
attention in the theoretical price fixing literature. For example, in a general model examining "product 
differentiation‐collusion sustainability," Colombo ([11]) treats product differentiation as exogenous. 
4 On the use of LOB data, see Scherer et al. ([29]) and Ravenscraft and Wagner ([27]). 
5 This assumes that R&D intensity in the ready‐mix concrete industry is below average—a safe assumption. Of 
the 220 industries in the LOB data for which R&D intensity can be calculated, 140 (64%) have below 
average R&D intensity. 
6 Note that these are Probit coefficient estimates and not marginal effects. Because the LOB report cautions: 
"Special care is necessary when the specialization ratio or the coverage ratio is relatively low," the 
estimating sample for both specifications is restricted to only include industries with coverage and 
specialization ratios above the respective ratio's sample mean minus two standard errors. 
7 These were obtained for 1977 from Weiss and Pascoe ([34]). 
8 Correlations among the regressors and variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all low, but the condition number is 
high (39.2). 
9 Also, SIC industries are not antitrust markets; they are generally much broader in scope than antitrust markets 
(Werden [35]). An example specific to this sample is a price conspiracy involving three gas meter 
manufacturers. The relevant SIC industry includes not only gas meters, but also odometers, parking 
meters, pedometers, production counters, speedometers, tachometers, taxi meters, and many other 
products. 
10 Unfortunately, firm‐level data have their own issues. In particular, R&D expenditure data are generally only 
available for public firms. Moreover, such data are rarely available at the line of business level (where 
antitrust violations occur). For example, DuPont participated in an automotive refinishing paint price 
conspiracy in the early 1990s. While aggregate R&D data are easily obtained for DuPont, disaggregated 
R&D data are not readily available for DuPont's automotive paint LOB. 
11 This is not a design where firms cooperate on R&D, and perhaps subsequently engage in price collusion. See 
Potters and Suetens ([26]) for a survey of experimental work in this domain. 
12 This design is geared towards examining the relationship between innovation and conduct, as opposed to 
innovation and (market) structure. For experiments on the latter, see Darai, Sacco, and Schmutzler 
([12]), Sacco and Schmutzler ([28]), and Aghion et al. ([1]). 
13 It may be helpful to picture this experimental environment in the following way: four similar firms can engage 
in product innovation over many years. Developing a new product gives a particular firm temporary 
market power, but new innovations can be quickly copied by the other firms. Firms that do not develop 
a new product must compete on price with any other non‐innovating firms. As reported in Section C, the 
data indicate that noninnovators can successfully collude when the duration of market power is just one 
period. If the duration of market power were more than one period, collusion among unsuccessful 
subjects might be even more successful. 
14 An alternative experimental design where each subject's market type is imposed exogenously would have 
certain advantages over the design employed, namely, no possibility of market competition affecting 
innovation. However, I examine the possibility that market outcomes affect innovation in "Did Collusive 
Success Affect Innovation?" section and find no evidence that they do. 
15 This design element was induced to potentially speed up the experiment, but in practice the time limit was 
never binding for the vast majority of subjects. 
16 For example, Holt and Davis ([21]) report that price announcements increase prices in posted‐price markets 
(at least temporarily), Huck, Müller, and Normann ([22]) show that fixed matching increases collusion, 
and Fonseca and Normann ([16]) demonstrate that communication increases collusion in Bertrand 
oligopolies. 
17 These are not equilibria levels of innovation. 
18 In the two‐seller case, either firm would prefer to charge a monopoly price (above 8.25) relative to a residual 
inverse demand curve, so 8.25 is not an equilibrium price. 
19 Either duopolist can be assured $1.22 from selling 2 units at $8.76. This is the upper bound on the price 
support for the equilibrium mixing distribution. It follows from 4p‾−38.15−8.25=1.22 that the lower 
bound is $8.48. The equilibrium cumulative distribution for price is F(p) = (33.92 − 4p)/(16.40 − 2p). The 
median price of $8.57 is calculated by setting F(p) = 0.5. To determine the mean price, F(p) is calculated 
for all incremental prices of $0.001 on [8.480, 8.760]. The probability of any one incremental price being 
chosen is estimated numerically. Finally, the mean price of $8.59 is calculated by summing all 
incremental prices multiplied by their associated probabilities. 
20 The result that innovation expenditure is inversely related to the probability of innovation success follows 
from the fact that market profits and the marginal cost of innovation are assumed to be identical across 
treatments. This is crucial for focusing on the effect of the likelihood of innovation success on collusion, 
but if market profit and the probability of success are not orthogonal, then it may be true that more 
innovation should be attempted in markets with a higher likelihood of innovation success relative to 
markets with a lower likelihood of innovation success. 
21 Because the experiments had known, finite time horizons, a Folk Theorem result with a supra‐competitive 
price equilibrium in the Market stage is not strictly applicable. But experiments have shown that 
subjects can be cooperative in finite‐horizon games (see, e.g., Huck, Normann, and Oechssler [23]). If 
supra‐competitive pricing is observed in the Standard markets it will be precisely because subjects are 
"cooperative." 
22 All the LA data were collected after the collection of all of the R data. Subject behavior in the experiments 
need not be identical across the two schools. What is important is that any treatment differences—if 
they exist—are robust across the two subject populations. 
23 Per the laboratory rules at the two schools, subjects received US$10.00 at the research school and US$7.00 at 
the liberal arts school for arriving at the computer lab on time. To equalize the average total payments 
across subject populations, the exchange rate between dollars and experimental currency was US$0.30 
for $1.00 for the research school sessions and US$0.50 for $1.00 for the subjects at the liberal arts 
school. 
24 Under‐investment is also observed in similar experimental environments in Isaac and Reynolds ([24]) and 
Smyth ([31]). 
25 A market‐period is the observation of a particular market type in a particular period. The number of market‐
periods in any given period ranged from 1 (zero subjects successfully innovated) to 4 (all subjects 
successfully innovated). Thus, the number of market‐periods is not identical to the 
number markets × periods. During one of the sessions, an error was detected in the software code. This 
glitch affected two market‐periods in the LO‐LA treatment. These market‐periods are dropped from the 
analysis. 
26 Full chat transcripts are available from the author. 
27 See Bigoni et al. ([5]) and the references therein, and Block and Gerety ([6]). 
28 Robust rank order tests are used because in three of the four cases, a null hypothesis of equal variance is 
rejected. 
29 A robust rank order test indicates that the mean of the distribution of average market prices for LO‐R is 
greater than the corresponding mean for HI‐R (U= 2.13, p= 0.033, two‐tailed). The same is true for the 
equivalent LO‐LA and SHI‐LA comparison (U= 4.76, p< 0.001, two‐tailed). 
30 Standard errors in parenthesis. The coefficient estimate on experience is still statistically, significantly 
different from zero (p< .001) when an indicator variable for subject population is added to specification 
(3). The coefficient estimate for this indicator is not significantly different from zero (p= 0.297). 
31 This calculus does ignore the costs savings from foregoing all innovation attempts. 
* I am grateful to the Michael J. Piette Fellowship and to the Economic Science Institute for funding. I thank 
Mark Isaac, Gary Fournier, Cortney Rodet, Bart Wilson, and seminar participants at Florida State, 
Chapman, Marquette, Massachusetts Amherst, and the London Experimental Workshop for helpful 
comments. I also thank two anonymous referees and Anthony Kwasnica for comments that have 
improved the paper. Naturally, any errors are my own. 
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